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Abstract 
 
Using data from China, we examine whether and how the incentive to boost GDP growth at the 
government level affects earnings management at the firm level. We find that firms in provinces 
with GDP growth lower than the national level or the average of the adjacent provinces are more 
likely to engage in earnings management than firms in other provinces. Specifically, we find that 
these firms are more likely to inflate their revenues, overproduce, and delay their asset 
impairment losses, which are the three main channels through which corporate accounting 
numbers can affect the calculation of GDP. The aggregate earnings management induced by 
GDP growth incentives accounts for about 0.5% of GDP. The results are stronger for local state-
owned enterprises, over which provincial government officials have more influence, and in 
provinces with a lower level of marketization, where government intervention is more prevalent. 
The results are also stronger for firms in provinces with younger governors and in the years 
immediately prior to the turnover of provincial officials, when GDP growth plays an important 
role in determining whether the officials get promoted. Overall, this paper is the first to provide 
systematic evidence on how firms engage in earnings management to boost the GDP growth in 
their provinces.  
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1. Introduction 
In this paper, we examine whether and how GDP growth incentives at the government 
level affect earnings management at the firm level. The gross domestic product (GDP) is an 
important measure of the economic development of a country (e.g., Henderson et al. 2012; BEA 
2017). Many important government decisions, such as budget and monetary policies, and many 
corporate decisions, such as investments, are affected by the level and growth of GDP. However, 
despite the importance of GDP and the potential adverse consequences of reporting inaccurate 
GDP figures, GDP is difficult to measure and GDP figures are often inaccurate, especially in 
developing countries, partly due to their weak statistical infrastructure (e.g., Henderson et al. 
2012; Johnson et al. 2013). Moreover, the reported GDP figures are often “manipulated,” 
especially in weak or non-democracies (e.g., Magee and Doces 2015; Martinez 2018).1  
GDP manipulation is arguably most prevalent in China. Whenever China announces its 
GDP figures, many people express skepticism, including high-ranking government officials (e.g., 
Owyang and Shell 2017).2 Although the reliability of the national GDP figures has improved, 
GDP manipulation is still prevalent at the provincial level.3 For example, the sum of the GDP of 
all of the provinces is invariably higher than the national GDP calculated by the National Bureau 
of Statistics of China (NBS), with the discrepancy being as high as RMB3.5 trillion in 2010, or 
                                                 
1 GDP manipulation is not limited to developing countries and non-democracies. It also occurs in other countries, 
although on a much smaller scale. See Holtz (2014) for examples of political interference in statistics in the U.S. 
Also see https://dailyreckoning.com/manipulating-the-masses/, accessed on October 3, 2018.  
2 In 2010, WikiLeaks released a conversation that took place in 2007 between Li Keqiang, the then-governor of 
Liaoning province, and the U.S. Ambassador to China. Li was quoted as saying that the GDP figure reported by his 
province was “unreliable” and “man-made” (World Finance, February 16, 2018, 
https://www.worldfinance.com/markets/gdp-whats-in-a-number, accessed on October 3, 2018). 
3 The highest subnational division in China is the province. Mainland China has 22 provinces, 4 provincial-level 
municipalities (i.e., Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Chongqing), and 5 autonomous regions. In this paper, we refer 
to all of these divisions as provinces for ease of presentation.  
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8% of the national GDP.4 (The discrepancy in the U.S. is usually around 1% of the national 
GDP.) Recently, a number of provinces in China (e.g., Liaoning and Tianjin) admitted that the 
GDP figures reported in the previous years were greatly inflated. For example, in January 2018, 
the Tianjin government admitted that the GDP for 2016 was RMB665.4 billion, not the 
originally reported RMB1,000.2 billion, reflecting a 50% inflation.5  
Despite the prevalence of GDP manipulation, limited research has systematically examined 
the ways provincial officials manipulate the GDP figures. The popular press suggests that typical 
methods include (1) inflating local investment figures, (2) keeping “zombie” firms in operation, 
and (3) firms reporting inflated accounting numbers in response to local governments’ pressure.6 
We focus on the last approach, which appears to be widespread. For example, in 2018 the NBS 
announced that due to the pressure from local governments, 97 firms reported greatly inflated 
numbers, including sales, to their local statistical bureaus.7 Some provinces set explicit targets 
for local state-owned enterprises (SOEs). For example, Jiangxi Province set the 2018 sales and 
net income growth target at 10% for all local SOEs. 
We investigate whether and how firms manage their accounting numbers to inflate the 
GDP figures in their respective provinces. We focus on China for a number of reasons. First, as 
mentioned above, the manipulation of provincial GDP figures is prevalent in China, and thus 
focusing on China can increase the power of the tests. Second, China is the second largest 
economy in the world and a primary destination for foreign investments. As such, China’s 
                                                 
4 The discrepancy can be due to the different scope of analyses used by the NBS and the provincial bureaus of 
statistics, double counting across provinces, and GDP manipulation at the provincial level.  
5 http://www.xinhuanet.com/mrdx/2018-01/20/c_136910201.htm. Accessed on October 3, 2018. 
6 For examples, see http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjfw/bgt2018/201811/t20181129_1636614.html (the first method) and 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/zl/bank/20151221/095724050544.shtml (the second method). Accessed on October 3, 
2018. 
7 In 2017, the NBS established a platform to publicize cases of enterprises reporting inaccurate statistical numbers. 
See http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjfw/bgt2018/201809/t20180918_1623468.html. Accessed on October 3, 2018. 
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economic data is crucial for determining the state of the world economy (e.g., Koch-Weser 
2013), and it is important that China and other countries can access accurate data. Third, 
provincial officials in China can influence listed firms’ decisions, and provincial GDP growth 
incentives can thus affect firms’ operating and reporting decisions. Lastly, China’s capital 
markets are increasingly connected with the global capital markets. It has become easier for 
outside investors to trade in Chinese listed firms, as indicated by the inclusion of many Chinese 
listed firms in the MCSI index. Thus, it is important that global market participants understand 
how government incentives affect the quality of Chinese listed firms’ financial statements.  
There are various reasons why provincial governments manipulate their GDP figures. The 
most important one is that GDP growth is the primary metric that is used to evaluate local 
governments and their officials. Since the mid-1990s, the Chinese government has shifted its 
main focus to economic development and used GDP as the main measure of economic growth. 
Since then, GDP growth has become an important determinant of the promotion and career 
advancement of government officials (e.g., Xu 2011). Under the mounting pressure to deliver 
GDP growth, provincial government officials have used various means to boost GDP growth, 
including reforming economic structures, providing subsidies to promising sectors, and investing 
more in infrastructures. These measures have greatly contributed to the economic development 
of China. However, when these measures are not sufficient, provincial officials likely turn to 
GDP manipulation. As mentioned above, to manipulate GDP figures, government officials 
commonly pressure firms to report inflated accounting numbers. 
How listed firms engage in earnings management to boost the GDP growth of their 
provinces depends on the link between firms’ financial statements and the calculation of GDP. 
Note that we use the term of earnings management for convenience and to be consistent with the 
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earnings management literature. What is important for GDP growth is not earnings per se, but 
the specific accounting items that affect GDP calculation, as discussed below. In China, annual 
GDP is calculated as the weighted average of the GDP calculated under the production and 
income approaches with respective weights of 0.75 and 0.25. For both approaches, GDP is the 
total value-added of all the economic units. Under the production approach, value-added is total 
outputs minus intermediate inputs. For listed firms, total outputs are the sum of sales, change in 
inventory, and value-added taxes, whereas intermediate inputs are the expenditures paid for 
products and services used in the production process (e.g., raw materials). Under the income 
approach, value-added is the sum of operating income, compensation to employees, production 
taxes (e.g., sales taxes, value-added taxes), and fixed asset depreciation. Note that investment 
returns and fair value gains/losses are excluded from operating income for the purpose of GDP 
calculation, but asset impairment losses are not.  
Based on these two approaches of GDP calculation, we conclude that firms can increase 
GDP by increasing their sales and inventory and delaying their asset impairment losses. By 
increasing sales (e.g., selling products to customers with poor credit) and inventory (e.g., 
overproduction), firms can directly increase the GDP calculated using the production approach. 
This can also increase operating income and thus the GDP under the income approach. Similarly, 
delaying asset impairment losses can increase operating income and the GDP under the income 
approach. As such, we develop three earnings management proxies that are relevant to the 
calculation of GDP: discretionary revenues (DR), overproduction (Abnormal_PROD), and 
abnormal impairment losses (Abnormal_Impairment). The estimation of theses proxies is based 
on models used in the prior literature (e.g., Francis et al. 1996; Riedl 2004; Roychowdhury 2006; 
McNichols and Stubben 2008; Stubben 2010). We also construct an overall earnings 
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management proxy, Overall_EM, based on the three individual measures.  
Not all provincial officials have the same incentives to increase GDP growth. We argue 
that provincial officials have stronger incentives to increase the GDP figures when the GDP 
growth in their provinces lags behind the national level or the average GDP growth of the 
adjacent provinces. National GDP growth is an important statistic in China, and lagging behind it 
signals that a province is not doing well economically and can negatively affect the promotional 
prospects of the provincial officials (e.g., Maskin et al. 2000). Similarly, geographically close 
provinces face similar economic conditions, and the provincial officials compete with each other 
for promotion (e.g., Qian and Roland 1998). Thus, the officials from provinces whose GDP 
growth lags behind the adjacent provinces have stronger incentives to boost their GDP figures.  
Using 21,702 firm-year observations in the 2002-2016 period, we find that firms in 
provinces with GDP growth lower than the national level or the average GDP growth of the 
adjacent provinces, referred to as provinces with strong GDP growth incentives, are more likely 
to engage in earnings management in the future than firms in other provinces. More specifically, 
they are more likely to inflate revenues, overproduce, and delay asset impairment losses. This 
effect is economically significant: the increases in sales and inventory and the decrease in asset 
impairment losses are about 0.90%, 0.98%, and 0.21% of total assets, respectively. The 
estimated aggregate level of earnings management induced by GDP growth incentives is on 
average 0.5% of GDP at the province-year level. The results are robust when using the 
subsample with GDP growth incentives only (without firms’ own earnings management 
incentives) and when using an alternative GDP growth incentive measure – the GDP growth 
target measure in Lyu et al. (2018). In addition, we perform a falsification test using earnings 
management measures based on accounting numbers that do not affect GDP calculation and do 
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not find significant results, strengthening our inferences. 
We conduct a number of cross-sectional analyses to provide additional insights. Because a 
key premise of our arguments is that provincial officials can influence the operations and 
financial reporting practices of the firms in their provinces, the findings should be stronger when 
provincial officials have a greater influence over the firms. Using local state-owned enterprises 
(local SOEs, versus central SOEs or non-SOE firms) and the low marketization of the province 
to capture the provincial officials’ ability to influence firms, we document results consistent with 
this prediction. Another key premise of our arguments is that provincial officials have incentives 
to boost GDP figures for promotion purposes. Because the official retirement age of government 
officials in China is 65, the likelihood of promotion and thus the incentive to increase GDP 
should be stronger for younger officials. In addition, provincial officials in China have regular 
turnover years, and the incentive to increase GDP should be stronger prior to regular turnover 
years. Consistent with these predictions, we find that the results are more pronounced for firms 
from provinces with young provincial governors (60 or younger) than for the other firms and are 
more pronounced in the two years prior to the regular turnover years than in the other years.  
Earnings management is costly for firms. Selling products or services to customers with 
poor credit can lead to higher bad debt expenses, and overproduction can lead to inventory write-
offs. Indeed, we find that the extent of earnings management induced by GDP growth incentives 
is positively associated with future bad debt expenses, inventory write-offs, and asset impairment 
losses, and is negatively associated with future ROA. These results also suggest that firms cannot 
continuously engage in earnings management in the long run. In addition, given the costs of 
engaging in earnings management, it would be interesting to know whether the provincial 
governments compensate the firms to offset such costs, at least partially. We find that those firms 
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that engage in earnings management to boost GDP growth receive higher government subsidies 
and obtain more long-term loans than the other firms. We also find consistent evidence that 
earrings management to boost GDP growth is effective – such earning management helps 
provinces meet GDP growth benchmarks and increases the chance of the provincial governor’s 
promotion.  
The paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it extends the earnings 
management literature by investigating the effect of government officials’ GDP growth 
incentives on firms’ financial reporting practices. Prior earnings management research has 
mostly focused on the incentives of managers and firms.8 Although some studies have 
investigated earnings management associated with political considerations, the focus is on how 
firms engage in downward earnings management to reduce political costs (Watts and 
Zimmerman 1986). In contrast, we focus on the upward earnings management driven by 
government officials’ incentives to boost GDP. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first 
paper that examines how firms engage in earnings management in response to government 
officials’ incentives to boost economic growth metrics.  
Second, this paper is the first to provide systematic evidence on how firms inflate revenues, 
overproduce, and delay asset impairment to increase GDP when the provinces in which they 
reside have strong GDP growth incentives. Although prior studies have examined whether GDP 
figures are manipulated (e.g., Lyu et al. 2018), there is scarce evidence on the means by which 
GDP figures are manipulated.  
Lastly, this paper extends the literature on the link between firm-level earnings and 
macroeconomic activities. This literature has examined whether and why firm-level earnings can 
                                                 
8 See Dechow and Skinner (2000) and Dechow, Ge, and Schrand (2010) for reviews of the literature. 
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be used to better predict macroeconomic indicators, such as inflation, monetary policies, and 
GDP growth, and vice versa.9 Unlike those studies, which take firm-level earnings and 
macroeconomic indicators as given, we investigate how the link between firm-level accounting 
numbers and GDP growth induces firm-level earnings management when government officials 
have strong incentives to boost GDP growth.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the background 
and develops the hypotheses. Section 3 presents the sample, data, and research design. Section 4 
reports the main analyses and Section 5 the additional analyses. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Background and hypothesis development 
2.1 The calculation of GDP and its relation to financial statements 
2.1.1 GDP – definition and calculation  
GDP refers to the total dollar value of the goods and services produced by a country or a 
region over a specific period. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
defines GDP as “the sum of the gross values added of all resident and institutional units engaged 
in production.”10 The International Monetary Fund defines GDP as “the monetary value of final 
goods and services – that is, those that are bought by the final user – produced in a country in a 
given period of time.”11 
GDP can be measured using three approaches: the production approach, the income 
approach, and the expenditure approach. Under the production approach, GDP is calculated as 
the sum of the value-added at each stage of production and services, where value-added is the 
                                                 
9 For examples, see Bonsall, Bozanic, and Fisher (2013), Konchitchki and Patatoukas (2014), Li et al. (2014), Ball 
and Sadka (2015), and Shivakumar and Urcan (2017). 
10 https://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=1163. Accessed on October 3, 2018. 
11 http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/basics/gdp.htm. Accessed on October 3, 2018. 
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difference between sales and the value of the inputs in the production process (e.g., raw 
materials). Under the income approach, GDP is calculated as the income generated from 
production and mainly comprises the compensation received by employees and the operating 
income of companies. Under the expenditure approach, GDP is calculated as the total value of 
purchases made by all final users. 
2.1.2 The use and calculation of GDP in China 
In this section, we first discuss how GDP is calculated in China and how certain accounting 
items can affect the calculation of GDP. We then develop the earnings management proxies. 
Note that our earnings management proxies are based on the accounting numbers that become 
part of GDP and are not general earnings management proxies.  
China adopted the concept of GDP in the early 1980s when China began the economic 
reform. In 1985, China issued the Gross Domestic Product Calculation Framework (Pilot 
Program) and started to use GDP as a supplementary measure of its economy. In October 1993, 
the government issued the Gross National Product – Explanation and Calculation Framework 
and started to use GDP as the main measure of its economy. In May 1997, China issued the 
China Annual Gross Domestic Product Calculation Approaches based on the 1993 version of the 
United Nations System of National Accounts. This document provides detailed discussions of the 
principles and approaches for calculating GDP. The formulas, forms, and steps that are used to 
calculate GDP were formalized with the publications of the China Gross Domestic Product 
Calculation Handbook in 2001 and the China’s System of National Accounts in 2002. Since then, 
the scope and calculation of GDP have been refined to reflect the changes in China’s economic 
structure, such as the growing service and financial sectors.  
The approaches that are used to calculate GDP in China largely follow the international 
practices. The annual GDP is calculated as the weighted average of the GDP based on the 
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production and income approaches, with corresponding weights of 0.75 and 0.25. Under both the 
production and income approaches, the GDP is calculated as the sum of the value-added of all of 
the units in the economy. However, the calculation of value-added is different under the two 
approaches.12 Under the production approach, value-added is the difference between total 
outputs and intermediate inputs. Total outputs are calculated as: 
Total outputs = Sales + End-of-period inventory – Beginning-of-period inventory + 
Value-added taxes        
Intermediate inputs are essentially the costs of the raw materials and services related to 
production, management, sales, and financing, but excluding expenditures related to fixed assets 
(e.g., depreciation) and compensation paid to employees.  
Under the income approach, value-added is calculated as: 
Value-added = Compensation to employees + Production taxes + Fixed asset 
depreciation + Operating income 
In China, operating income is calculated as sales minus operating expenses (e.g., cost of goods 
sold), production taxes, SG&A, financing expenses, and asset impairment losses, and plus 
investment returns and fair value gains/losses. However, investment returns and fair value 
gains/losses are excluded from operating income when calculating GDP. 
Based on the above discussions, we conclude that three items can be manipulated to 
increase the GDP figures: (1) sales, (2) inventory, and (3) asset impairment losses.13  
                                                 
12 The calculation of GDP has many nuances. Our discussions here focus on the main principles and basic formulas.  
13 In an untabulated analysis, we examine the contemporaneous relation between these three accounts and GDP 
growth. Specifically, we regress a province’s GDP growth rate on the contemporaneous growth rate of aggregate 
sales, aggregate inventory, and aggregate asset impairment losses of all the listed firms in the province, as well as 
the province’s lagged GDP growth rate. We find that GDP growth rate is positively correlated with the growth rate 
of aggregate sales and aggregate inventory and is negatively correlated with the growth rate of aggregate asset 
impairment losses (t = 10.14, 6.19, -2.88, respectively), confirming the importance of these measures in the 
calculation of GDP. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3439132
 
11 
 
 
Sales. Firms can increase their sales in various ways, including selling products/services to 
customers with low credit ratings without recording the corresponding bad debt expenses. 
Increasing sales can increase the GDP calculated under the production approach because sales 
are used directly in the calculation. It can also increase the GDP under the income approach 
because operating income increases with sales.  
Inventory. Increasing the end-of-period inventory can increase the GDP calculated under 
the production approach. While the materials and services purchased from third parties reduce 
the value-added because intermediate inputs are deducted, the compensation paid to employees 
is not deducted.14 Thus, firms can increase their value-added through overproduction. Under the 
income approach, overproduction can also increase the GDP – when firms overproduce, 
compensation paid to employees increases, and operating income also increases because the unit 
cost and the cost of goods sold decrease.  
Asset impairment losses. Under the income approach, asset impairment losses reduce the 
operating income and thus the GDP. Accordingly, firms can delay their asset impairment losses 
to increase the GDP.  
Given that we can only observe these items of listed firms, ex ante, whether managing the 
above three items can make a meaningful impact on GDP calculation is an empirical question. 
To showcase the importance of listed firms, Figure 1 plots the aggregate accounting numbers of 
listed firms (the accounting numbers that affect GDP calculation) as a percentage of GDP over 
time. As shown in the figure, total sales of all listed firms gradually increase from 14% of GDP 
in 2002 to 33% in 2016. Similarly, inventory and operating income increase from 3.3% and 3.5% 
                                                 
14 At the same time, one firm’s intermediate inputs are another firm’s value-added, which also increases GDP. 
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of GDP in 2002 to 10% and 11% in 2016, respectively.15 The increasing trend and the high 
percentages indicate that managing these accounts can have a meaningful impact on GDP growth 
figures. At the same time, we acknowledge that it is just one of the possible approaches 
provincial officials can use to influence GDP figures.16 
Unlike the above three specific items, the typical accruals-based earnings management 
proxies used in the literature do not work in our setting, because some of the accruals items do 
not affect the calculation of GDP. For example, reducing depreciation expenses can increase 
operating income, but depreciation expenses are added back in the calculation of GDP under the 
income approach. The typical real earnings management proxies do not work either. For 
example, cutting R&D expenditures does not necessarily increase GDP – while cutting R&D 
increases operating income, it also decreases the compensation paid to the employees involved in 
R&D activities. Similarly for cutting SG&A. Meanwhile, we would like to note that we are not 
trying to identify all the possible earnings management strategies for boosting GDP growth. 
2.2 Hypothesis development – The main prediction 
Since the 1980s, China’s central and provincial governments have paid increasing attention 
to economic growth and development (e.g., Montinola et al. 1995; Li and Zhou 2005; Xu 2011). 
Prior research suggests that two features of China’s political institutions are critical to its 
economic development. First, the central government has adopted a number of measures, 
including economic decentralization, to provide provincial governments with the independence 
and incentives to pursue economic growth (e.g., Blanchard and Shleifer 2000). Second, the 
                                                 
15 Under the income approach of GDP calculation, compensation to employees, production taxes, and fixed asset 
depreciation are added back to operating income. We make the same adjustment in Figure 1. Separately, we would 
like to note that asset impairment losses are a small component of GDP, increasing from 0% of GDP in 2002 to 
0.4% in 2016. Readers should therefore interpret the results on asset impairment losses with caution.  
16 During the sample period, listed firms become an increasingly greater part of the economy in China. In terms of 
sales, we find that listed firms account for 15.5% of total sales of all firms (listed and private firms) in China in 2002 
and this percentage increases to 26.9% by 2016.  
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central government continues to exercise control over the personnel matters of the subnational 
governments, including the appointment, promotion, and demotion of provincial officials. These 
two features lead to a tournament among provincial governments and a strong focus on 
provincial economic growth (e.g., Qian and Xu 1993; Qian and Roland 1998; Blanchard and 
Shleifer 2000; Jin et al. 2005). Given that GDP growth is one of the most important measures of 
economic development, it has been widely used to evaluate the performance of top provincial 
officials (e.g., Xu 2011).  
In China, the two most senior provincial officials are the party secretary and governor, with 
the governor having a lower political rank than the party secretary. In terms of the opportunities 
for promotion, the provincial party secretary can be promoted to the State Council, vice premier, 
premier, or the Politburo (Xu 2011). However, given the small number of available positions, the 
likelihood of promotion is relatively low for provincial party secretaries (Xu, Wang, and Yuan 
2007). In contrast, the provincial governor has more opportunities for promotion, to the governor 
of a larger province, the party secretary of a province, or an equal-ranking position in a central 
government ministry. Although the party secretary and governor of a province work together to 
develop the province, the governor is usually in charge of the province’s economic development, 
while the party secretary is mainly in charge of party and social matters. Accordingly, GDP 
growth is one of the most important determinants of a provincial governor’s promotion.  
Prior research has confirmed empirically that officials from better performing provinces are 
more likely to be promoted. For example, Chen, Li, and Zhou (2005) and Li and Zhou (2005) 
find that provincial officials are more likely to be promoted when the province’s GDP growth is 
higher than the national level. Sheng (2009) further finds that provincial GDP growth is an 
important determinant of promotion for provincial governors, but not for party secretaries.  
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Given the focus on economic growth, if value-added activities fail to boost GDP growth to 
the desired level, provincial officials will likely pressure the firms in their provinces to alter their 
operations and reporting practices to boost the GDP figures.17 Shleifer and Vishny (1998) argue 
that self-interested politicians exploit their political power to exercise control over SOEs for their 
own interests. Provincial officials can wield significant influence over listed firms directly 
through government ownership and control, or indirectly through means such as bureaucracy, 
regulations, and political connections (e.g., Piotroski et al. 2015). As discussed above, a firm’s 
sales and inventory increase GDP, while asset impairment losses reduce GDP. Thus, to boost 
GDP growth, provincial officials can induce the firms in their provinces to increase sales and 
inventory and delay asset impairment losses.  
Of course, not all provincial officials have the same incentives to boost GDP growth. We 
argue that provincial officials have stronger incentives when the GDP growth in their provinces 
lags behind the national level or the average GDP growth of the adjacent provinces. National 
GDP growth is a prominent statistic in China (Holz 2014), and lagging behind it sends a strong 
signal that the province is not doing well, thus reducing the likelihood of its officials getting 
promotion. In addition, not all provinces have similar economic conditions or development 
opportunities. Provinces that are geographically close to each other have similar economic 
conditions, and thus the officials from these provinces compete for promotion opportunities, 
leading to a tournament among adjacent provinces. For example, using U.S. data, Besley and 
Case (1996) find that the performance of a state relative to its neighboring states (in terms of 
taxation policies) has a positive effect on the re-election of the state’s governor. Thus, the 
                                                 
17 In a similar vein, Piotroski and Zhang (2014) find that when provincial officials are evaluated based on market 
development, they pressure firms to go public prematurely. The idea is also similar to how executive compensation 
induces earnings management (e.g., Bartov and Mohanram 2004; Cheng and Warfield 2005). 
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officials from the provinces that lag behind their adjacent provinces likely have stronger 
incentives to boost GDP growth.  
In sum, we argue that the provinces with GDP growth below the national level or the 
average level of the adjacent provinces have stronger incentives to inflate GDP figures via 
earnings management. As such, we state our first hypothesis as follows:  
H1: Ceteris paribus, firms in provinces with stronger GDP growth incentives are more 
likely to engage in earnings management than firms in other provinces. 
 
We might not find results consistent with H1 for several reasons. First, if it is well 
understood that firms engage in earnings management to boost GDP growth in the provinces 
with strong GDP growth incentives and the central government adjusts its evaluation and 
promotion decisions accordingly, the provincial officials will have weaker incentives to 
manipulate GDP growth. Second, the decentralization of state-owned firms and the interests of 
the provincial governments in developing the capital markets can insulate firms from the 
governments’ short-term incentives (e.g., Piotroski and Zhang 2014). Lastly, given the 
maturation of the capital markets in China, firms’ reputation concerns and external parties’ (such 
as auditors’) monitoring can reduce firms’ incentives to yield to the pressure from government 
officials to engage in earnings management. Thus, whether we can find results consistent with 
H1 is an empirical question.  
2.3 Hypothesis development – Cross-sectional variation 
To affect firms’ operations and financial reporting decisions, provincial officials need to 
have (1) the ability to influence firms’ decisions and (2) the incentives to boost GDP growth. 
Below, we develop predictions based on variations in the provincial officials’ ability to influence 
firms and their incentives to boost GDP growth.  
First, the effect of GDP growth incentives on earnings management should be stronger for 
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the firms over which provincial officials have greater influence. There are three types of listed 
firms in China based on ownership structure: local state-owned enterprises (SOE), central SOEs, 
and private or non-SOE firms. One key attribute of SOEs is government ownership and control. 
As Djankov et al. (2003) point out, government ownership is the strongest form of government 
intervention as it enables governments to directly intervene in corporate decisions. A key 
difference between central and local SOEs is the authority they report to. Local SOEs report to 
the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) of the province, 
which then reports to the provincial governor and party secretary. The compensation and 
promotion of the senior executives of local SOEs are largely decided by the provincial officials 
(Brandt and Li 2003). In contrast, the provincial officials have limited influence over central 
SOEs, which report to the SASAC of the State Council (Chen et al. 2011), and non-SOE firms 
due to the lack of government ownership. As such, we expect that the effect of GDP growth 
incentives will be stronger for local SOEs than for other firms. Our second hypothesis is stated as 
follows: 
H2: Ceteris paribus, the effect of GDP growth incentives on earnings management, as 
stated in H1, is stronger for local SOE firms than for central SOE or non-SOE firms. 
 
Second, the government’s influence over firms also varies with the level of marketization 
in the province. Although China has made great progress in marketization, the extent of the 
progress varies across provinces (Jin et al. 2005). In some provinces, such as Jiangsu, 
Guangdong, and Zhejiang, the markets are well developed and government intervention is 
limited (Chen et al. 2015). However, in the provinces where the markets are not well developed, 
the governments still exercise considerable control over firms (Fan, Wang, and Yu 2016).18 For 
                                                 
18 Prior research has shown that firms’ opportunistic behavior is more prevalent in regions with weak legal 
institutions and poor market development in China (e.g., Jian and Wong 2010). 
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example, Wang et al. (2008) find that the effect of government intervention on the choice of 
external auditors is more pronounced in regions with less developed markets. Accordingly, the 
effect of GDP growth incentives should be stronger in the provinces with lower levels of 
marketization. Our third hypothesis is stated as follows: 
H3: Ceteris paribus, the effect of GDP growth incentives on earnings management, as 
stated in H1, is stronger for firms in the provinces with lower levels of marketization 
than for firms in other provinces. 
 
Third, our argument for provincial officials’ incentives to boost GDP growth is based on 
the premise that the officials in the provinces with higher GDP growth are more likely to be 
promoted. Because provincial officials have an official retirement age of 65 in China (Li and 
Zhou 2005) and those close to the retirement age are unlikely to be promoted before retirement, 
older provincial officials will have weaker incentives to compete on GDP growth (Chen et al. 
2017). In contrast, younger provincial officials have stronger incentives to increase GDP growth 
of their provinces so as to increase their chances of being promoted. We thus expect the effect of 
GDP growth incentives to be stronger for firms in the provinces with younger officials. Our 
fourth hypothesis is stated as follows: 
H4: Ceteris paribus, the effect of GDP growth incentives on earnings management, as 
stated in H1, is stronger for firms in the provinces with younger provincial officials 
than for firms in other provinces. 
 
Lastly, provincial governments in China undergo a leadership transition every five years, 
usually in the year before the official turnover of the central government. Given that GDP growth 
is one of the main metrics the central government uses to evaluate provincial officials, the 
provincial officials have stronger incentives to boost GDP growth in the years before the regular 
turnover year.19 Accordingly, the effect of GDP growth incentives should be stronger in the years 
                                                 
19 Consistent with this notion, prior research finds that government spending, investments, and IPO listings intensify 
before the turnover of officials at both the central and provincial levels in China (e.g., Piotroski and Zhang 2014). 
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immediately before the regular turnover year. Our last hypothesis is stated as follows: 
H5: Ceteris paribus, the effect of GDP growth incentives on earnings management, as 
stated in H1, is stronger in the years immediately before the regular turnover year for 
provincial officials than in other years. 
 
3. Sample and research design 
3.1 Sample and data 
The initial sample comprises all the firms listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock 
Exchanges over the 2002-2016 period. The sample period starts from 2002 when the approaches 
that are used to calculate GDP were formalized and when listed firms became more 
representative of the Chinese economy after the increasing number of IPOs.  
We obtain the financial statement data from the China Securities Markets and Accounting 
Research Database (CSMAR) and from firms’ annual reports when necessary. We restrict our 
sample to non-financial firms because earnings management proxies are different for financial 
firms. We exclude firms for which we cannot identify the ultimate controlling shareholder and 
the nature of firm ownership (e.g., SOE or not). We further exclude firm-year observations 
without data to calculate earnings management proxies and control variables. The final sample 
consists of 21,702 firm-year observations. Table 1 summarizes the sample selection procedures. 
3.2 Measurement of GDP growth incentives 
To measure GDP growth incentives, we hand-collect the GDP data of each province from 
the websites of the Statistics Communique on National Economy and Social Development and 
National Statistics Yearbook. In China, total GDP in dollar amount is calculated using current 
year prices (i.e., nominal GDP), but GDP growth is calculated using constant prices (i.e., real 
GDP growth). The first GDP growth incentive measure, GDP_Incentive1, is based on the 
comparison between the provincial-level and national-level GDP growth. GDP_Incentive1 is an 
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indicator variable for the provinces with GDP growth lower than the national level. The second 
measure, GDP_Incentive2, is based on the comparison between the provincial-level GDP growth 
and the average GDP growth of the adjacent provinces, i.e., those provinces that share a border 
with the province. GDP_Incentive2 is an indicator variable for the provinces with GDP growth 
lower than the average GDP growth of the adjacent provinces. Please see Figure 2 for a map of 
China, which shows the adjacent provinces of each province. Lastly, we construct a composite 
measure, GDP_Incentive, based on the two individual measures. It equals 1 if GDP_Incentive1 
or GDP_Incentive2 is 1, and 0 otherwise. For simplicity, we use the composite measure in the 
analyses; the inferences using the individual measures are the same. 
Appendix A uses Qinghai and Fujian provinces as examples to illustrate the calculation of 
the GDP growth incentive measures. 
As reported in Table 2, about 12.6 percent of the sample firms are from provinces with 
GDP growth lower than the national level,20 and about 54.9 percent of the sample firms are from 
provinces with GDP growth lower than the average GDP growth of the adjacent provinces. 
Overall, about 55.6% of the sample firms are from provinces with GDP growth incentives as 
measured by GDP_Incentive. 
3.3 Measurement of earnings management proxies 
As discussed earlier, inflated revenues, overproduction, and delay of asset impairment 
losses can increase GDP. Below we discuss how we measure the abnormal levels of revenues, 
production (inventory), and asset impairment losses. 
Revenue inflation. Because firms can increase revenues by selling products or services on 
credit, we use abnormal accounts receivable to detect revenue inflation. Specifically, we estimate 
                                                 
20 This implies that the majority of the provinces report GDP growth higher than the national level, which is based 
on the figures from the NBS. This is another sign of GDP manipulation at the provincial level.  
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discretionary revenues using the models developed in McNichols and Stubben (2008) and 
Stubben (2010). The following regression is estimated for each industry-year with at least 15 
observations: 
∆𝐴𝑅 𝛼 𝛽 ∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝜀  ,   
where ΔAR is the annual change in accounts receivable scaled by lagged total assets and ΔSales 
is the annual change in sales scaled by lagged total assets. Discretionary revenues (DR) is the 
residual estimated from the regressions. 
Overproduction. Firms can increase inventories through overproduction. Following 
Roychowdhury (2006), we use the following model to estimate overproduction:  
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
𝛼
1
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
𝛼
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
𝛼
𝛥𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
𝛼
𝛥𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
𝜀  , 
where PROD is the sum of the cost of goods sold and the change in inventory. The above 
regression is estimated for each industry-year with at least 15 observations. The overproduction 
proxy, Abnormal_PROD, is the residual estimated from the regressions.  
Delay of asset impairment losses. We estimate the level of asset impairment losses using 
the factors identified in the literature (e.g., Francis et al. 1996; Riedl 2004). Specifically, we 
estimate the magnitude of asset impairment losses (scaled by lagged total assets) as a function of 
the contemporaneous change in provincial GDP growth, the contemporaneous change in the 
firm’s pre-write-off earnings, firm size, audit quality, and the lagged asset impairment losses. 
The regression is estimated for each industry-year with at least 15 observations. Abnormal asset 
impairment losses (Abnormal_Impairment) is negative one times the residual estimated from the 
regressions. We multiply the residual by negative one, so that a higher value indicates upward 
earnings management, in order to be consistent with the other measures. 
Overall EM proxy. Lastly, we construct an overall earnings management proxy, 
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Overall_EM, which is the sum of the above three measures. The higher this aggregate measure, 
the more likely the firm engages in earnings management to boost GDP growth.21 
As reported in Table 2, the means of the earnings management proxies are around zero by 
design, but the standard deviations of the proxies are generally large, ranging from 0.012 (1.2% 
of total assets) for Abnormal_Impairment to 0.118 (11.8% of total assets) for Overall_EM.22  
A potential concern with using financial statement data to calculate the earnings 
management proxies is that the data submitted to the provincial Bureaus of Statistics may differ 
from the financial statements. To shed light on this issue, we visited the Municipal Bureau of 
Statistics and the National Economic Accounting Office of one provincial-level municipality, 
who are in charge of collecting data for calculating the provincial GDP. The director of the 
bureau and the head of the accounting office both confirmed that the data submitted by the listed 
firms to the Bureau of Statistics is identical to what’s reported in the financial statements. In 
addition, a national level inspection team regularly inspects the submitted data to ensure 
accuracy. Nevertheless, it is possible that some firms have submitted data that is different from 
their financial statements, which biases against finding results.  
3.4 Empirical Model 
To test H1, we regress the earnings management proxies on the lagged GDP growth 
incentive measure and control variables: 
                                                 
21 While China differs from the U.S. in the underlying economic infrastructures (e.g., Allen et al. 2009; Carpenter 
and Whitelaw 2017), we believe that the estimation models for the earnings management proxies developed using 
the U.S. data apply to Chinese firms. We are not aware of any systematic issues with applying the earnings 
management proxies developed in the U.S. to Chinese firms. Prior studies of Chinese firms have also adopted the 
commonly used earnings management proxies developed in the U.S. (e.g., Zhang et al. 2010; Chen et al. 2011; Liu 
et al. 2016). The possibility that these models capture earnings management in Chinese firms with noises would bias 
against finding results consistent with our hypotheses.   
22 We calculate the earnings management proxies based on the consolidated figures of the listed firms. According to 
our conversations with several statistics bureau officials, firms report the consolidated figures to the statistics 
bureaus without adjusting for the amounts from their out-of-province subsidiaries. Our inferences remain the same 
when we adjust the financial numbers by removing the amounts from the out-of-province subsidiaries.  
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𝐸𝑀 𝛼 𝛼 𝐺𝐷𝑃_𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝜷 𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒐𝒍𝒔𝒊𝒕
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦,𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 𝜀  , 
 
(1) 
 
where EM is one of the four earnings management proxies: discretionary revenues (DR), 
overproduction (Abnormal_PROD), abnormal asset impairment losses (Abnormal_Impairment), 
and the overall earnings management proxy (Overall_EM). We use the lagged GDP growth 
incentive to capture provincial officials’ incentives to boost GDP when their GDP growth is 
lower than the national level or the average of the adjacent provinces in year t-1. In addition, 
using the lagged GDP growth incentive can avoid the potential mechanical relationship between 
earnings management proxies and contemporaneous GDP incentive measure. H1 predicts that 
GDP growth incentive has a positive effect on upward earnings management; thus α1 is expected 
to be positive.  
Following the earnings management literature (e.g., Cheng and Warfield 2005; Haw et al. 
2005; Bowen et al. 2008), we control for the firm characteristics that might affect earnings 
management: lagged firm profitability (ROE_NEG_L, ROE_SEO_L),23 firm size (SIZE), 
leverage (LEV), book-to-market ratio (BM), growth opportunities (GROWTH), and an indicator 
for seasoned equity offerings (SEO) in the next year (SEO_F). We also control for a number of 
corporate governance variables that prior research suggests can affect the extent of earnings 
management. Following Klein (2002) and Liu and Lu (2007), we control for the total 
compensation of the top three executives (EXEC_COMP), an indicator for CEO-Chairman 
duality (DUAL), board independence (BOARD_IND), the ultimate controlling shareholder’s 
ownership (CONTROL_OWN), an indicator for the controlling shareholder’s share pledging 
                                                 
23 Listed firms in China have to satisfy certain profitability requirements before they can issue additional shares. 
Prior research finds that listed firms engage in earnings management to meet these profitability requirements (e.g., 
Chen and Yuan 2004; Haw et al. 2005). As such, we include an indicator variable for whether firms meet the SEO 
profitability requirement (ROE_SEO_L). We do not use contemporaneous profitability measures to avoid their 
spurious effects on earnings management proxies. 
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(PLEDGE), and an indicator for Big 4 auditors (BIG4). We also control for industry, year, and 
province fixed effects. Appendix B provides variable measurements. To reduce the effect of 
extreme values, we winsorize the continuous control variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles.  
The descriptive statistics on the control variables are similar to those reported in prior 
research of Chinese listed firms. As reported in Table 2, about 10.9% and 52.4% of the sample 
firms have negative ROE and ROE lower than the SEO profitability requirement in the previous 
year, respectively. About 11.7% of the sample firms issue additional shares in the next year. On 
average, the sample firms have RMB7,750 million worth of total assets, leverage of 0.489, book-
to-market ratio of 0.548, and annual sales growth of 20.3%. In terms of the governance variables, 
on average, the total compensation of the top three executives is RMB2,731 thousand, board 
independence is 35.8%, 17.6% of the firms have CEO-Chairman duality, the controlling 
shareholder owns 36.3% of the shares, the controlling shareholder of 31% of the firms pledge 
their shares, and 5.7% of the firms have a Big 4 auditor.  
 
4. Main analyses  
In this section, we first report the tests of the main prediction and then the tests of the 
cross-sectional predictions.  
4.1 Tests of H1  
4.1.1 Main results 
Table 3 reports the regression results from the tests of H1 using the four earnings 
management proxies. As reported, GDP_Incentive is positively associated with DR, 
Abnormal_PROD, Abnormal_Impairment, and Overall_EM (t = 11.65, 5.52, 10.33, and 10.58, 
respectively). All the t-statistics are based on standard errors adjusted for clustering at the firm 
and year levels. In terms of economic significance, compared to the firms in other provinces, 
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those in the provinces with GDP growth incentives have higher DR (0.0090), higher 
Abnormal_PROD (0.0098), higher Abnormal_Impairment (0.0021), and higher Overall_EM 
(0.0209). (Note that higher Abnormal_Impairment implies lower asset impairment losses.) These 
values represent 0.90%, 0.98%, 0.21%, and 2.09% of the lagged total assets, indicating that the 
effects are economically significant.  
To evaluate the overall economic significance of the phenomenon, we estimate the amount 
of earnings management induced by GDP growth incentives (Induced_EM). We first estimate 
Regression (1) using Overall_EM as the dependent variable and including both GDP_Incentive1 
and GDP_Incentive2 in the regression. Induced_EM for individual firms is estimated as the 
predicted earnings management by the two GDP growth incentive measures. We then transform 
Induced_EM into a dollar amount by multiplying it by lagged total assets. Lastly, we aggregate 
Induced_EM across all the listed firms in a province-year and scale the sum by the lagged GDP 
for the province-year. We find that the total amount of induced earnings management for a 
province-year is on average 0.5% of lagged GDP. This magnitude is significant given that the 
average provincial GDP growth is 11.4% during the sample period. 
The results for the control variables vary somewhat across the earnings management 
proxies. For the overall earnings management proxy, we find that the extent of earnings 
management is positively associated with the indicator for ROE being lower than the SEO 
profitability requirement, leverage, book-to-market ratio, sales growth, the indicator for SEO in 
the next year, and the controlling shareholder’s ownership and share pledging, and negatively 
associated with the indicator for negative ROE, executive compensation, and audit quality. 
In sum, we find that, consistent with H1, firms in provinces with stronger GDP growth 
incentives are more likely to engage in earnings management than firms in other provinces. 
4.1.2 Sensitivity tests 
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We conduct a number of sensitivity tests to ensure the robustness of our results. First, the 
above results might be driven by firms’ own earnings management incentives, instead of GDP 
growth incentives. To address this concern, we identify the firm-years where GDP growth 
incentives exist, but firms’ earnings management incentives do not exist. Using ROE_SEO_L to 
capture firms’ earnings management incentives, there are 5,821 such firm-years (GDP_Incentive 
= 1 and ROE_SEO_L = 0). We re-estimate Regression (1) including these firm-years and the 
firm-years without GDP growth incentives or firms’ earnings management incentives as the 
benchmark group. As reported in Panel A of Table 4, the coefficient on GDP_Incentive 
continues to be significantly positive, suggesting that the documented results are unlikely to be 
driven by firms’ own earnings management incentives.    
Second, each province sets a GDP growth target at the beginning of the year. After the first 
half of the year, a province usually has a better idea of whether it can achieve the target. Not 
achieving the target is usually regarded as a failure of the provincial government. As such, the 
provinces that do not expect to meet their targets have strong incentives to increase their GDP in 
the second half of the year. Consistent with this notion, Lyu et al. (2018) document a 
disproportionally high frequency of meeting or just beating GDP growth targets. To investigate 
whether firms engage in earnings management to meet the GDP growth target, we construct a 
GDP growth incentive measure based on whether the actual GDP meets or just beats the GDP 
growth target, GDP_MJB. GDP_MJB equals 1 if the difference between the actual and target 
GDP growth is in the range of [0, 0.2], and 0 otherwise.24 Panel B of Table 4 reports the 
regression results. As reported, the coefficient on GDP_MJB is significantly positive for the four 
                                                 
24 Using a slightly different range, such as [0, 0.1] or [0, 0.3], leads to the same inferences. Note that while 
GDP_Incentive is measured in year t-1, GDP_MJB is measured contemporaneously with the earnings management 
proxies in year t. 
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earnings management proxies (t = 1.93, 2.65, 2.09, and 3.33, respectively). In addition, the 
results on GDP_Incentive continue to hold – the magnitude and significance of the coefficients 
are almost identical to those in Table 3. These results suggest that the GDP growth incentives 
examined in the main analysis and the incentive to meet or just beat the GDP growth target co-
exist. 25, 26  
Lastly, we notice that GDP_Incentive is sticky; the correlation coefficient between 
GDP_Incentive and its one-year lag is 0.601, significant at the 0.01 level. Controlling for the 
lagged measure (measured in year t-2) leads to the same inferences (untabulated). In addition, we 
find that the coefficient on the lagged measure is significantly negative in the analyses of DR, 
Abnormal_PROD, and Overall_EM, reflecting the reversal nature of earnings management.27  
4.1.3 Falsification tests 
To further strengthen the main inferences, we conduct a falsification test using earnings 
management proxies not related to GDP calculation. We argue above that listed firms can 
increase sales and inventory and delay asset impairment losses to increase GDP growth because 
these measures affect GDP calculation. It thus follows that we should not find results for 
earnings management proxies based on the accounting numbers that do not affect GDP 
calculation. To test this conjecture, we construct two earnings management proxies: (1) modified 
discretionary accruals based on total accruals excluding the change in accounts receivable, the 
                                                 
25 Untabulated F-tests indicate that the coefficient on GDP_Incentive is significantly larger than that on GDP_MJB, 
except for Abnormal_PROD. As such, we use GDP_Incentive as our main GDP growth incentive measure 
throughout the paper. 
26 We also replicate the cross-sectional tests using GDP_MJB to capture GDP growth incentives (untabulated). We 
find that the positive effect of GDP_MJB on the extent of earnings management is stronger for local SOE firms than 
for the other firms and stronger in the years before the regular turnover of provincial officials than in the other years. 
27 In an untabulated test, we find that the inferences hold for both the first half and the second half of the sample 
period. However, we find that the results are weaker for the analysis of DR in the most recent years, 2013-2016. 
Chinese President Xi Jinping started his first term in 2013 and launched a number of initiatives, including 
environmental protection and campaign against official corruption. These initiatives likely reduce the focus on GDP 
growth in the evaluation of provincial officials.  
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change in inventory, and asset impairment losses, and (2) the real earnings management proxy 
based on discretionary expenditures per Roychowdhury (2006).  
Table 5 reports the regression results. As reported, the coefficient on GDP growth incentive 
is insignificant at the conventional levels for both proxies. The insignificant results from these 
falsification tests help strengthen the main inferences. 
4.2 Cross-sectional analyses – Tests of H2 ~ H5 
4.2.1 Firm ownership type – Tests of H2 
H2 states that the effect of GDP growth incentives on earnings management is stronger for 
local SOE firms than for the other firms. To test H2, we construct an indicator variable, 
Local_SOE, which equals 1 if the firm is a state-owned enterprise reporting to the provincial 
SASAC. We add this variable and its interaction with GDP_Incentive to Regression (1) and 
report the results in Panel A of Table 6. The coefficient on GDP_Incentive captures the effect of 
GDP growth incentives on earnings management for central SOE and non-SOE firms, and the 
coefficient on GDP_Incentive × Local_SOE captures the incremental effect for local SOE firms. 
As reported, we find that GDP growth incentives have an insignificant effect on earnings 
management for central SOE and non-SOE firms. In contrast, the incremental effect for local 
SOE firms is significantly positive for all the earnings management measures at the 1% level. 
The untabulated F-test indicates that the net effect of GDP growth incentives for local SOE firms 
is significant at the 1% level for all the earnings management proxies.  
Interestingly, the coefficient on Local_SOE is significantly negative for the analyses of DR, 
Abnormal_PROD, and Overall_EM. This result implies that when there are no GDP growth 
incentives, local SOE firms engage in downward earnings management, consistent with the 
reversal nature of earnings management. 
Overall, the stronger results for local SOE firms than for the other firms are consistent with 
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H2. The findings suggest that provincial officials are able to boost GDP growth by influencing 
the production activities and financial reporting practices of local SOEs.  
4.2.2 The extent of marketization – Tests of H3 
H3 predicts that the effect of GDP growth incentives on earnings management is stronger 
for firms in the provinces with a lower level of marketization, where government intervention is 
more prevalent. To test H3, we construct an indicator variable, Low_Market, for the provinces 
with a lower level of marketization. Specifically, Low_Market equals 1 for the province-years 
with a below-the-sample-median marketization index; the marketization index data is from Fan, 
Wang, and Yu (2016). We add Low_Market and its interaction with GDP_Incentive to 
Regression (1).  
Panel B of Table 6 reports the regression results. As reported, the coefficient on 
GDP_Incentive is significantly positive for all the earnings management proxies, suggesting that 
GDP growth incentives induce provincial officials to intervene in firms’ operations and financial 
reporting to boost GDP growth. More importantly, the coefficient on GDP_Incentive × 
Low_Market is significantly positive for DR, Abnormal_Impairment, and Overall_EM (t = 3.56, 
2.05, and 2.86, respectively). These results are consistent with H3. 
4.2.3 Age of provincial officials – Tests of H4 
H4 predicts that the effect of GDP growth incentives on earnings management is stronger 
for firms in the provinces with younger provincial officials, who have stronger incentives to 
boost GDP growth. To test H4, we construct an indicator variable, Young_Governor, which 
equals 1 if the provincial governor is 60 or younger. We add this variable and its interaction with 
GDP_Incentive to Regression (1). We use the governor’s age to define this variable, because the 
provincial governor is in charge of the province’s economy and GDP growth is more important 
for the governor’s promotion than for the party secretary’s. 
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Panel C of Table 6 reports the regression results. As reported, the coefficient on 
GDP_Incentive is significantly positive for all the earnings management proxies, suggesting that 
GDP growth incentives motivate the provincial leaders who are older than 60 to boost GDP 
growth. More importantly, the coefficient on GDP_Incentive × Young_Governor is significantly 
positive for all four earnings management proxies (t = 5.18, 2.16, 1.72, and 4.16, respectively). 
This result suggests that compared with their older counterparts, younger provincial governors 
have stronger incentives to boost GDP growth by inducing the firms in their provinces to engage 
in earnings management. 
4.2.4 Years before government official turnover – Tests of H5 
H5 predicts that the effect of GDP growth incentives on earnings management is stronger 
in the years immediately before the turnover year than in other years. To test H5, we construct an 
indicator variable, Turnover, for the two years before the regular turnover of the provincial 
officials. During our sample period, the central government leadership turnover occurred in 
2007, 2012, and 2017 when the National Congress of the Communist Party of China was held. 
The provincial leadership turnover usually occurred one year earlier, in 2006, 2011, and 2016.28 
As such, Turnover is set as 1 for the years 2004-2005, 2009-2010, and 2014-2015, and 0 for the 
other years. We add Turnover and its interaction with GDP_Incentive to Regression (1).  
Panel D of Table 6 reports the regression results. As reported, the coefficient on 
GDP_Incentive is significantly positive for all the earnings management proxies, suggesting that 
GDP growth incentives motivate the provincial officials to boost GDP growth. More 
importantly, the coefficient on GDP_Incentive × Turnover is significantly positive for DR, 
                                                 
28 Turnover can also occur in other years for various reasons. For example, some governors are promoted in the 
middle of their term, some resign before the term ends because they have reached retirement age, and others are 
demoted or prosecuted for corruption. 
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Abnormal_Impairment, and Overall_EM (t = 3.03, 6.31, and 2.59, respectively). This result 
suggests that consistent with H5, provincial officials have stronger incentives to induce the firms 
in their provinces to engage in earnings management to increase GDP growth in the years 
immediately before the regular turnover years than in the other years.29 
 
5. Additional tests 
5.1 The cost of engaging in earnings management to boost GDP growth  
The above analyses show that firms engage in various earnings management activities to 
increase GDP in their provinces when the provinces’ GDP growth is below the national level or 
the average GDP growth of the adjacent provinces. However, earnings management is costly for 
firms. For example, increasing sales to customers with lower credit quality can lead to higher 
future bad debt expenses. Similarly, overproduction can lead to future inventory write-offs and 
delaying asset impairment losses can lead to future asset impairment losses. All of these can lead 
to lower firm performance in the future. 
To investigate whether this is the case, we regress future bad debt expenses (Bad_Debt), 
inventory write-offs (Inventory_Off), asset impairment losses (Impairment), and return on assets 
(ROA) on an indicator variable for higher induced earnings management, Induced_EM_H, the 
lagged dependent variable (measured in year t), and control variables. Induced_EM_H equals 1 
for firm-years with Induced_EM higher than the sample median, where Induced_EM is the level 
of earnings management predicted by GDP growth incentives, as explained in Section 4.1.1. We 
follow Lewellen and Resutek (2019) in the choice and measurement of control variables.   
                                                 
29 Interestingly, the coefficient on Turnover is significantly negative for Abnormal_PROD and Overall_EM. This 
result suggests that when there are no GDP growth incentives, firms in the provinces with upcoming provincial 
official turnover engage in downward earnings management, consistent with the reversal nature of earnings 
management. 
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Table 7 reports the regression results, with Panel A for Bad_Debt, Panel B for 
Inventory_Off, Panel C for Impairment, and Panel D for ROA. In each panel, we present the one-
year-ahead, two-years-ahead, and three-years-ahead analyses. As reported, the coefficient on 
Induced_EM_H is significantly positive for future bad debt expenses (except the three-years-
ahead measure), inventory write-offs (except the three-years-ahead measure), and asset 
impairment losses (except the one-year-ahead measure), and is significantly negative for future 
ROA. The effects are also economically significant. For example, an increase in Induced_EM_H 
from zero to one is associated with a decrease in one-year-ahead ROA of 1.39%, two-years-
ahead ROA of 1.63%, and three-years-ahead ROA of 1.43%. (The average ROA in those years is 
4.42%).  
Overall, these results indicate that engaging in earnings management to increase GDP 
growth is costly for firms because it eventually leads to higher bad debt expenses, higher 
inventory write-offs, higher asset impairment losses, and lower ROA in the future.30 The results 
also suggest that firms cannot continuously inflate sales, overproduce, and delay asset 
impairment losses in the long run. 
5.2 Local versus non-local auditors  
Given the cost of engaging in earnings management, a natural question is whether auditors 
play a disciplining role in reducing earnings management. Throughout the analyses, we control 
for audit quality and indeed find that firms with Big 4 auditors engage in less earnings 
management, as indicated by the significantly negative coefficients on BIG4 in Table 3. 
However, only 5.7% of Chinese listed firms in our sample have Big 4 auditors, with the 
remaining firms using Chinese accounting firms. Some of these accounting firms have 
                                                 
30 We find similar evidence at the provincial level – the aggregate earnings management induced by GDP growth 
incentives is positively associated with one-year-ahead aggregate inventory write-offs and asset impairment losses. 
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headquarters in the same provinces as their listed client firms. While provincial officials can 
exert significant pressure on the accounting firms that are headquartered in their provinces, they 
have limited influence over the accounting firms with headquarters in other provinces. Thus, we 
expect the results to be weaker for firms with auditors that do not have headquarters in the same 
province (referred to as non-local auditors) than for firms with local auditors.  
We use a similar research design as the cross-sectional analyses to test this prediction. 
Non_Local_Auditor is set as 1 if the auditor’s headquarters is not in the same province as the 
firm’s headquarters, and 0 otherwise.31 We find that the coefficient on GDP_Incentive × 
Non_Local_Auditor is significantly negative for the analyses of DR, Abnormal_PROD, and 
Overall_EM (untabulated), indicating that hiring non-local auditors can constrain earnings 
management induced by provincial officials’ GDP growth incentives.  
5.3 Benefits of earnings management to boost GDP growth: Subsidies and loans 
Given the cost of earnings management, firms may expect some benefits from the 
governments when they engage in earnings management to boost GDP growth. A typical benefit 
is government subsidy, of which the most common type is a reduction in taxes (Chen et al. 
2008). Another benefit from the governments is the ability to obtain loans, since all major banks 
in China are state-owned (e.g., Cull and Xu 2005).  
In this section, we investigate whether firms that engage in earnings management to boost 
GDP are “compensated” with higher government subsidies and more loans. For this purpose, we 
regress government subsidies and the amount of new loans (both scaled by total assets) on GDP-
incentive-induced earnings management Induced_EM_H, as used in Table 7, and control 
                                                 
31 We regard the Big 4 auditors as non-local auditors. Alternatively, classifying them as local or non-local based on 
their headquarters in China (Beijing for E&Y and KPMG, and Shanghai for PwC and Deloitte) leads to 
quantitatively similar results.  
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variables. 32, 33 Table 8 reports the regression results. The coefficient on Induced_EM_H is 
significantly positive in both regressions (t = 2.56 and 3.09, respectively), suggesting that firms 
that engage in earnings management to boost their province’s GDP growth receive higher 
government subsidies and obtain more loans than the other firms.  
5.4 The effectiveness of earnings management 
We argue that provincial officials have incentives to boost GDP when their provinces lag 
behind the nation or the adjacent provinces in GDP growth, because their promotion depends on 
their provinces’ GDP growth. We further argue that provincial officials then pressure firms in 
their provinces to engage in earnings management. In this section, we investigate whether 
earnings management induced by GDP growth incentives is effective. First, we investigate 
whether such earnings management helps the province meet the GDP growth benchmark (i.e., 
the national GDP growth or the average GDP growth of the adjacent provinces). For this 
purpose, we estimate a logit regression of the likelihood of a province meeting or beating the 
GDP growth benchmark (GDPG_MB) on the aggregate amount of induced earnings 
management across all the listed firms in the province (Induced_EM_PH) and several lagged 
GDP growth variables. As reported in Panel A of Table 9, the coefficient on Induced_EM_PH is 
significantly positive, indicating that the likelihood of a province meeting or beating the GDP 
growth benchmark increases with the aggregate amount of earnings management induced by 
GDP growth incentives.  
Second, we investigate whether such earnings management increases provincial officials’ 
                                                 
32 Government subsidies (scaled by total assets) have a mean of 0.08% and a standard deviation of 0.58%. Note that 
government subsidies do not affect the GDP calculation.   
33 New loans (scaled by total assets) have a mean of 1.31% and a standard deviation of 6.59%. Separately, we do not 
find a significant impact of induced earnings management on interest rate, suggesting that the additional loans are 
not obtained at the expense of higher interest rate. 
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chance of being promoted. We estimate an ordered logit regression of a provincial governor’s 
promotion (Promotion) on the aggregate amount of induced earnings management in the 
province (Induced_EM_PH) and a number of variables suggested by prior research that explain 
governor promotion (e.g., Li and Zhou 2005).34 As reported in Panel B of Table 9, the coefficient 
on Induced_EM_PH is significantly positive, indicating that the likelihood of a provincial 
governor’s promotion increases with the aggregate amount of earnings management induced by 
GDP growth incentives. 
Overall, the above findings indicate that earnings management induced by GDP growth 
incentives is effective – it increases the likelihood that a province meets or beats the GDP growth 
benchmark and the likelihood that a provincial governor gets promoted.  
5.5 Provinces’ GDP growth incentives or firms’ earnings management incentives? 
An alternative explanation for our results is that the economic conditions in a province 
affect both the province’s GDP growth and the earnings management incentives of firms in the 
province. As such, the results might capture firms’ incentives to engage in earnings management 
in response to the underlying economic conditions, rather than provincial officials’ GDP growth 
incentives. However, there are several reasons why this alternative explanation is unlikely to 
hold. First, throughout the analyses, we control for a comprehensive list of firm and CEO 
characteristics that prior research suggests can affect firms’ incentives to engage in earnings 
management. Second, we use the lagged GDP growth incentives, which are based on the 
comparison between the province’s GDP growth and the national or adjacent provinces’ GDP 
growth, to explain future earnings management. It is unlikely that firms will engage in earnings 
                                                 
34 The governor promotion variable is set as 2 for governors who are promoted to a higher position (e.g., a 
province’s party secretary), 1 for those staying in the current position or moving to a similar position, and 0 for 
demotion. 
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management in response to the previous year’s GDP growth difference in the absence of GDP 
growth incentives. While it is possible that poor economic conditions (e.g., a downturn) can lead 
to firms’ poor performance, which in turn motivates firms to manage earnings, we control for 
this possibility by including two measures of firm performance throughout the analyses. In an 
untabulated analysis, we further control for the lagged GDP growth and obtain the same 
inferences. Third, the alternative explanation implies that all firms should be affected similarly. 
However, we find different results depending on firms’ ownership type, the level of 
marketization in the province, and the age and the turnover year of the provincial officials. 
Fourth, as discussed earlier, we do not find significant results for GDP growth incentives when 
we use earnings management proxies that are not related to GDP calculation. Lastly, as reported 
earlier, we obtain quantitatively similar results for GDP growth incentives after we restrict the 
analyses to those firm-years where firms’ earnings management incentives do not exist.  
Overall, the above discussions and the additional tests suggest that the alternative 
explanation is unlikely to explain our results. Nevertheless, we acknowledge that we cannot 
completely rule out the possibility that the documented effect of GDP growth incentives is 
confounded by unspecified firm incentives.  
 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we examine whether and how GDP growth incentives at the government 
level affect earnings management at the firm level. GDP growth is an important measure for 
evaluating a country’s economy. However, the importance of GDP growth can induce 
government officials to manipulate the GDP figures. Although GDP manipulation is a 
widespread phenomenon, it is arguably most prevalent in China, especially at the provincial 
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level. Provincial officials have particularly strong incentives to increase GDP growth when their 
province’s GDP growth lags behind the national level or the average level of the adjacent 
provinces, which can negatively affect the officials’ likelihood of being promoted. Accordingly, 
officials from these provinces are more likely to pressure the firms in their provinces to engage 
in earnings management to boost GDP growth.  
Using 21,702 firm-year observations in the 2002-2016 period from China, we find that 
firms in the provinces with GDP growth lower than the national level or the average level of the 
adjacent provinces are more likely to engage in earnings management than firms in the other 
provinces. More specifically, these firms are more likely to inflate revenues, overproduce, and 
delay asset impairment losses. In addition, we argue and find that the results vary with the 
provincial officials’ ability and incentives to influence firms’ operations and financial reporting 
practices. First, the results are more pronounced for local SOE firms, over which provincial 
officials have more control, than for central SOE and non-SOE firms, and for firms in provinces 
with a lower level of marketization, where government intervention is more prevalent. Second, 
the results are stronger for firms in provinces with younger governors and for the years 
immediately before the regular turnover of provincial officials. 
This paper contributes to the literature by investigating the effect of government officials’ 
incentives on firms’ earnings management. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to 
examine how firms engage in earnings management in response to government officials’ 
incentives to boost GDP growth. The paper also extends the emerging literature on the 
information link between firm-level performance and the macro economy by examining how 
such link leads to earnings management. Lastly, the paper provides systematic evidence on how 
Chinese provincial governments manipulate GDP figures. Such manipulation is costly not only 
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for the firms that manage earnings to boost GDP growth, but also for the society when 
governments and corporations make decisions based on the manipulated GDP figures. 
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Appendix A 
Examples of the calculation of the GDP growth incentive measures 
 
In this appendix, we use Qinghai and Fujian provinces as examples to illustrate how the three GDP growth incentive measures are calculated. Please refer to 
Appendix B for variable definitions. GDP growth is in percentage.  
  
    National level comparison  Adjacent province comparison   
Province Year 
Provincial 
GDP 
growth 
(A)  
National 
GDP 
growth 
(B) 
GDP_Incentive1 
(based on 
comparison 
between A and B)  GDP growth of adjacent provinces  
Average 
(C) 
GDP_Incentive2 
(based on 
comparison 
between A and C)  
GDP 
Incentive 
 
       Xinjiang Xizang Gansu Sichuan      
Qinghai 2005 12.2  11.4 0  10.9 12.1 11.8 12.6  11.9 0  0 
 2006 12.2  12.7 1  11.0 13.4 11.4 13.3  12.3 1  1 
 2007 13.5  14.2 1  12.2 14.0 12.3 14.5  13.3 0  1 
       
 
Guangdong Zhejiang Jiangxi       
Fujian 2005 11.6  11.4 0  13.8 12.8 12.8   13.1 1  1 
 2006 13.4  12.7 0  14.1 13.6 12.3   13.3 0  0 
 2007 15.2  14.2 0  14.9 14.7 13.2   14.3 0  0 
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Appendix B 
Variable measurements 
 
GDP growth incentive measures 
   
GDP_Incentive1 = An indicator variable based on the comparison of the GDP growth between 
the provincial and national levels; it equals 1 if the GDP growth of the 
province is lower than the national GDP growth, and 0 otherwise. 
GDP_Incentive2 = An indicator variable based on the comparison of the GDP growth between 
the province and the adjacent provinces; it equals 1 if the GDP growth of the 
province is lower than the average GDP growth of the adjacent provinces, 
and 0 otherwise. 
GDP_Incentive = A composite GDP growth incentive measure; it equals 1 if GDP_Incentive1 
or GDP_Incentive2 is 1, and 0 otherwise. 
   
Earnings management proxies  
   
DR = Discretionary revenues, calculated as the residuals from a regression of the 
annual change in accounts receivable on the annual change in sales, 
estimated for each industry-year with at least 15 observations. 
Abnormal_PROD = Abnormal production, calculated as the residuals from a regression of the 
sum of the cost of goods sold and the change in inventory on sales, 
concurrent and lagged change in sales, estimated for each industry-year with 
at least 15 observations. 
Abnormal_Impairment = Abnormal asset impairment losses, calculated as negative one times the 
residuals from a regression of the asset impairment losses on the change in 
provincial GDP growth rate, the change in the firm’s pre-write-off earnings, 
firm size, audit quality, and the lagged asset impairment losses, estimated for 
each industry-year with at least 15 observations.  
Overall_EM = Overall earnings management proxy, calculated as DR + Abnormal_PROD 
+ Abnormal_Impairment.  
   
Control variables 
   
ROE_NEG_L = An indicator variable for negative return on equity (ROE) in the previous 
year (t-1). 
ROE_SEO_L = An indicator variable for ROE being lower than the ROE requirement for 
seasoned equity offerings in the previous year (t-1), which is 10% for the 
2002-2005 period and 6% for the 2006-2016 period. 
SIZE = Natural logarithm of total assets in RMB. 
LEV = Total debt (the sum of current liabilities and long-term debt) scaled by total 
assets. 
BM = The ratio of the book value of assets to the market value of assets, which is 
calculated as the market value of equity plus the book value of total debt. 
GROWTH = Annual percentage change in sales. 
SEO_F = An indicator variable for firms that issue addition shares via right offerings 
in the next year (t+1). 
EXEC_COMP = Natural logarithm of the total compensation of the top three executives in 
RMB. 
DUAL = An indicator variable for CEO-Chairman duality. 
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BOARD_IND = The percentage of independent directors on the board. 
CONTROL_OWN = The ownership of the ultimate controlling shareholder. 
PLEDGE = An indicator variable for firms whose controlling shareholder engages in 
shares pledging. 
BIG4 = An indicator variable for Big 4 auditors. 
Industry fixed effects = Indicator variables for the industries, defined based on the industry 
classifications published by the China Securities Regulatory Commission in 
2012. 
Year fixed effects = Indicator variables for the years. 
Province fixed effects = Indicator variables for the provinces. 
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FIGURE 1  
Aggregate accounting measures over GDP over time  
 
This figure presents the time trend of aggregate sales over GDP (Sum_Sales/GDP), aggregate inventory over GDP 
(Sum_Inventory/GDP), and aggregate operating income over GDP (Sum_OpIncome/GDP). For Sum_Sales/GDP in a 
year, we first sum the sales of all the listed firms in a province, then divide the sum by the province’s GDP, and 
lastly take the average of the ratio across all the provinces. Similarly for Sum_Inventory/GDP and 
Sum_OpIncome/GDP. Note that this figure is based on all the listed firms with available data, not just the sample 
firms. Note also that under the income approach of GDP calculation, compensation to employees, production taxes, 
and fixed asset depreciation are added back to operating income. We make the same adjustment when calculating 
Sum_OpIncome/GDP.  
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FIGURE 2  
Map of China  
 
Below is a map of China (https://www.chinadiscovery.com/china-maps/china-provincial-map.html). 
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TABLE 1  
Sample selection  
 
This table describes the sample selection process. The final sample includes 21,702 firm-years over the 2002-2016 
period.  
 
Sample size 
Firm-year observations available from CSMAR over 2002-2016 23,452 
 
Less:  
Observations without data to calculate earnings management proxies 671 
   
Observations without information on firm ownership type 56 
   
Observations from firms in the financial industries 168 
 
Observations without data to calculate the control variables 855 
 
Final sample 21,702 
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TABLE 2  
Descriptive statistics 
 
This table reports the descriptive statistics on the GDP growth incentive measures, earnings management proxies, 
and firm characteristics. The sample includes 21,702 firm-years over the 2002-2016 period. See Appendix B for the 
variable measurements.  
 
 N mean Std. P25 median P75 
 
GDP growth incentive measures 
GDP_Incentive1 21,702 0.126 0.332 0 0 0 
GDP_Incentive2 21,702 0.549 0.498 0 1 1 
GDP_Incentive 21,702 0.556 0.497 0 1 1 
 
Earnings management proxies 
DR 21,702 0.004 0.046 -0.018 -0.001 0.019 
Abnormal_PROD 21,702 0.006 0.106 -0.051 0.009 0.063 
Abnormal_Impairment 21,702 0.001 0.012 -0.001 0.001 0.006 
Overall_EM 21,702 0.010 0.118 -0.054 0.011 0.072 
 
Control variables       
ROE_NEG_L 21,702 0.109 0.311 0 0 0 
ROE_SEO_L 21,702 0.524 0.499 0 1 1 
SIZE (raw value, in 
million RMB ) 21,702 7,750 17,259 1,252 2,617 6,077 
SIZE 21,702 21.81 1.252 20.95 21.68 22.53 
LEV 21,702 0.489 0.231 0.324 0.487 0.635 
BM 21,702 0.548 0.257 0.345 0.530 0.738 
GROWTH  21,702 0.203 0.590 -0.032 0.113 0.290 
SEO_F 21,702 0.117 0.321 0 0 0 
EXEC_COMP (raw 
value, in thousand RMB) 21,702 2,731 115,552 530 1,001 1,734 
EXEC_COMP 21,702 13.74 0.960 13.18 13.82 14.37 
DUAL 21,702 0.176 0.381 0 0 0 
BOARD_IND 21,702 0.358 0.070 0.333 0.333 0.400 
CONTROL_OWN 21,702 0.363 0.157 0.239 0.339 0.480 
PLEDGE 21,702 0.310 0.463 0 0 1 
BIG4 21,702 0.057 0.232 0 0 0 
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TABLE 3 
GDP growth incentives and earnings management 
 
This table reports the results from the following OLS regression: 
𝐸𝑀 𝛼 𝛼 𝐺𝐷𝑃_𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝜷 𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒐𝒍𝒔𝒊𝒕 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦,𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟,𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 𝜀  , 
where EM is one of the four earnings management proxies: discretionary revenues (DR), overproduction 
(Abnormal_PROD), abnormal asset impairment losses (Abnormal_Impairment), and the overall earnings 
management proxy (Overall_EM). See Appendix B for the variable measurements. The sample includes 21,702 
firm-years over the 2002-2016 period. Intercepts are included but are not reported. The t-statistics are based on 
standard errors adjusted for firm and year level clustering. ***, **, and * indicate two-sided significance at the 1 
percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively.  
 
 DR Abnormal_PROD Abnormal_Impairment Overall_EM 
GDP_Incentive 0.0090*** 0.0098*** 0.0021*** 0.0209*** 
 (11.65) (5.52) (10.33) (10.58) 
ROE_NEG_L -0.0052*** -0.0073*** -0.0004 -0.0130*** 
 (-4.37) (-3.14) (-1.06) (-4.75) 
ROE_SEO_L -0.0051*** 0.0350*** -0.0016*** 0.0283*** 
 (-7.08) (22.46) (-8.65) (16.01) 
SIZE 0.0001 -0.0006 -0.0004*** -0.0009 
 (0.04) (-0.57) (-3.06) (-0.81) 
LEV 0.0019 0.0835*** -0.0073*** 0.0781*** 
 (1.20) (24.71) (-11.87) (19.86) 
BM -0.0007 0.1001*** 0.0050*** 0.1043*** 
 (-0.37) (21.66) (10.09) (20.42) 
GROWTH 0.0075*** 0.0029 -0.0002 0.0103*** 
 (7.38) (1.48) (-0.82) (4.45) 
SEO_F 0.0041*** 0.0059*** 0.0011*** 0.0110*** 
 (3.67) (2.62) (4.32) (4.39) 
EXEC_COMP -0.0003 -0.0181*** 0.0002 -0.0182*** 
 (-0.64) (-15.69) (1.52) (-14.09) 
DUAL 0.0028*** 0.0006 -0.0000 0.0034 
 (3.07) (0.32) (-0.21) (1.59) 
BOARD_IND -0.0073 -0.0081 0.0003 -0.0151 
 (-1.44) (-0.76) (0.25) (-1.28) 
CONTROL_OWN -0.0031 0.0162*** 0.0023*** 0.0155*** 
 (-1.43) (3.31) (4.23) (2.82) 
PLEDGE 0.0018** 0.0065*** -0.0001 0.0082*** 
 (2.38) (4.00) (-0.61) (4.48) 
BIG4 -0.0038*** -0.0111*** -0.0007** -0.0156*** 
 (-3.18) (-3.46) (-2.36) (-4.38) 
Industry, year, province 
fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 21,702 21,702 21,702 21,702 
Adj. R2 0.0295 0.1428 0.0388 0.1139 
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TABLE 4 
GDP growth incentives and earnings management – Sensitivity tests 
 
This table reports two sets of sensitivity tests for the effect of GDP growth incentives on earnings management. 
Panel A is based on a subsample with GDP growth incentives only, and Panel B includes an additional measure of 
GDP growth incentives. In both panels, the dependent variable EM is one of the four earnings management proxies: 
discretionary revenues (DR), overproduction (Abnormal_PROD), abnormal asset impairment losses 
(Abnormal_Impairment), and the overall earnings management proxy (Overall_EM). See Appendix B for the 
variable measurements. Intercepts are included but are not reported. The t-statistics are based on standard errors 
adjusted for firm and year level clustering. ***, **, and * indicate two-sided significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, 
and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: GDP growth incentives only sample 
 
This panel reports the results from the OLS regression of EM on GDP_Incentive and the control variables. The 
regression uses a subsample of 5,821 firm-years where GDP growth incentives exist, but firms’ earnings management 
incentives do not exist (GDP_Incentive = 1 and ROE_SEO_L = 0) and a subsample of 4,499 firm-years without GDP 
growth incentives or firms’ earnings management incentives (GDP_Incentive = 0 and ROE_SEO_L = 0) as the benchmark 
group.  
 
 DR Abnormal_PROD Abnormal_Impairment Overall_EM 
GDP_Incentive 0.0087*** 0.0147*** 0.0017*** 0.0251*** 
 (6.82) (4.80) (6.19) (7.43) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry, year, province 
fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 10,320 10,320 10,320 10,320 
Adj. R2 0.0213 0.1476 0.0458 0.1241 
 
Panel B: Meeting/beating GDP growth targets and earnings management  
 
This panel reports the results from the OLS regression of EM on GDP_Incentive, an additional GDP growth 
incentive variable – meeting or just beating the GDP growth targets (GDP_MJB), and the control variables. 
GDP_MJB equals 1 if the difference between the actual and target GDP growth is in the range of [0, 0.2], and 0 
otherwise. The sample includes 21,539 firm-years over the 2002-2016 period.  
 
 DR Abnormal_PROD Abnormal_Impairment Overall_EM 
GDP_Incentive 0.0090*** 0.0099*** 0.0021*** 0.0210*** 
 (11.66) (5.53) (10.26) (10.58) 
GDP_MJB 0.0025* 0.0081*** 0.0007** 0.0113*** 
 (1.93) (2.65) (2.09) (3.33) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry, year, province 
fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 21,539 21,539 21,539 21,539 
Adj. R2 0.0295 0.1435 0.0386 0.1147 
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TABLE 5 
GDP growth incentives and earnings management – Falsification tests 
 
This table reports the results from the OLS regression of two earnings management proxies (EM) on GDP_Incentive 
and the control variables. EM is one of the following two proxies: (1) modified discretionary accruals (DA_Adj) 
from the Jones model based on total accruals excluding change in accounts receivable, change in inventory, and 
asset impairment losses, and (2) the discretionary selling, general, and administrative expenses (RM_DISX) per 
Roychowdhury (2006). Both measures are the residuals from the corresponding regressions estimated for each 
industry-year with at least 15 observations. See Appendix B for the measurements of the other variables. The sample 
includes all firm-years with available data over the 2002-2016 period. Intercepts are included but are not reported. 
The t-statistics are based on standard errors adjusted for firm and year level clustering. ***, **, and * indicate two-
sided significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
 
 DA_Adj RM_DISX 
GDP_Incentive -0.0030 0.0006 
 (-1.06) (0.46) 
Control variables Yes Yes 
Industry, year, province fixed effects Yes Yes 
N 14,959 19,895 
Adj. R2 0.0255 0.1209 
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TABLE 6 
GDP growth incentives and earnings management – Cross-sectional analyses 
This table reports the results from the OLS regression of the earnings management proxies (EM) on the GDP growth 
incentive (GDP_Incentive), the conditioning variable, their interaction, and the control variables. EM is one of the 
four proxies: discretionary revenues (DR), overproduction (Abnormal_PROD), abnormal asset impairment losses 
(Abnormal_Impairment), and the overall earnings management proxy (Overall_EM). The conditioning variable is 
the indicator for local SOE firms (Local_SOE) in Panel A, the indicator for low level of marketization in the 
province (Low_Market) in Panel B, the young provincial governor indicator (Young_Governor) in Panel C, and the 
indicator for the years right before provincial official turnover (Turnover) in Panel D. Local_SOE equals 1 if the 
firm is a state-owned enterprise reporting to the provincial SASAC, and 0 otherwise. Low_Market equals 1 if the 
marketization index of a province-year is lower than the median marketization index of all the provinces for that 
year, and 0 otherwise; the marketization index is from Fan, Wang, and Yu (2016). Young_ Governor equals 1 if the 
provincial governor is 60 or younger, and 0 otherwise. Turnover equals 1 for years 2004-2005, 2009-2010, and 
2014-2015, the two years before the regular provincial official turnover, and 0 otherwise. See Appendix B for the 
measurements of the other variables. The sample includes 21,702 firm-years over the 2002-2016 period. Intercepts 
are included but are not reported. The t-statistics are based on standard errors adjusted for firm and year level 
clustering. ***, **, and * indicate two-sided significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, 
respectively.  
Panel A: GDP growth incentives and earnings management – Firm ownership type 
 
 DR Abnormal_PROD Abnormal_Impairment Overall_EM 
GDP_Incentive 0.0009 0.0003 -0.0003 0.0009 
 (0.95) (0.14) (-1.24) (0.37) 
Local_SOE -0.0023** -0.0060** -0.0003 -0.0087*** 
 (-2.48) (-2.57) (-1.19) (-3.36) 
GDP_Incentive × Local_SOE 0.0252*** 0.0288*** 0.0076*** 0.0615*** 
 (21.90) (10.10) (25.88) (19.58) 
 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry, year, province 
fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 21,702 21,702 21,702 21,702 
Adj. R2 0.0542 0.1476 0.0750 0.1342 
 
Panel B: GDP growth incentives and earnings management – The level of marketization 
 
 DR Abnormal_PROD Abnormal_Impairment Overall_EM 
GDP_Incentive 0.0074*** 0.0083*** 0.0019*** 0.0176*** 
 (8.45) (4.05) (8.34) (7.73) 
Low_Market -0.0029 -0.0010 -0.0011* -0.0050 
 (-1.50) (-0.21) (-1.83) (-0.95) 
GDP_Incentive × Low_Market 0.0065*** 0.0060 0.0011** 0.0136*** 
 (3.56) (1.40) (2.05) (2.86) 
 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry, year, province 
fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 21,702 21,702 21,702 21,702 
Adj. R2 0.0300 0.1429 0.0389 0.1142 
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TABLE 6 (cont’d) 
 
Panel C: GDP growth incentives and earnings management – Provincial governor age 
 
 DR Abnormal_PROD Abnormal_Impairment Overall_EM 
GDP_Incentive 0.0046*** 0.0055** 0.0017*** 0.0119*** 
 (4.14) (2.15) (5.94) (4.19) 
Young_Governor 0.0004 0.0032 -0.0003 0.0033 
 (0.45) (1.35) (-1.27) (1.27) 
GDP_Incentive × Young_Governor 0.0067*** 0.0065** 0.0006* 0.0139*** 
 (5.18) (2.16) (1.72) (4.16) 
 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry, year, province 
fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 21,702 21,702 21,702 21,702 
Adj. R2 0.0320 0.1437 0.0388 0.1161 
 
Panel D: GDP growth incentives and earnings management – Years before provincial official turnover 
 
 DR Abnormal_PROD Abnormal_Impairment Overall_EM 
GDP_Incentive 0.0074*** 0.0089*** 0.0012*** 0.0176*** 
 (8.05) (4.25) (5.19) (7.56) 
Turnover 0.0039* -0.0207*** -0.0000 -0.0168*** 
 (1.84) (-4.37) (-0.05) (-3.16) 
GDP_Incentive × Turnover 0.0040*** 0.0023 0.0021*** 0.0084*** 
 (3.03) (0.80) (6.31) (2.59) 
 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry, year, province 
fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 21,702 21,702 21,702 21,702 
Adj. R2 0.0299 0.1428 0.0405 0.1141 
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TABLE 7 
Earnings management induced by GDP growth incentives and future performance 
measures 
 
This table reports the results from the OLS regression of future performance measures on the extent of earnings 
management induced by the GDP growth incentives. Induced_EM is calculated as the amount of Overall_EM 
predicted by GDP_Incentive1 and GDP_Incentive2 in a regression of Overall_EM on these two GDP growth 
incentive measures and the control variables in Regression (1). Induced_EM_H is an indicator variable for firm-
years with Induced_EM above the sample median. Bad_Debt is bad debt expenses scaled by average total assets. 
Inventory_Off is inventory write-offs scaled by average total assets. Impairment is asset impairment losses scaled by 
average total assets. ROA is net income scaled by average total assets. ∆NWC is the change in net working capital 
(NWC) scaled by average total assets, where NWC is current operating assets minus current operating liabilities. 
∆LTNOA is the change in long-term net operating assets (LTNOA) scaled by average total assets, where LTNOA is 
total assets minus current assets and non-debt long-term liabilities. ∆Sales is the change in net revenue scaled by 
average total assets. For each panel, the dependent variable is estimated one-year-ahead, two-years-ahead, and three-
years-ahead. Intercepts are included but are not reported. The t-statistics are based on standard errors adjusted for 
firm and year level clustering. ***, **, and * indicate two-sided significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 
percent levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Future bad debt expenses 
 
 Bad_Debtt+k 
 t+1 t+2 t+3 
Induced_EM_Ht 0.0002** 0.0003*** 0.0001 
 (2.39) (3.50) (0.76) 
Bad_Debtt 0.2699*** 0.1697*** 0.1123*** 
 (16.00) (9.90) (7.05) 
ROAt 0.0023** 0.0044*** -0.0001 
 (2.09) (3.97) (-0.13) 
∆NWCt 0.0002 0.0011** 0.0007 
 (0.59) (2.44) (1.56) 
∆LTNOAt -0.0013*** -0.0002 0.0002 
 (-3.68) (-0.52) (0.42) 
∆Salest+k -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0006* 
 (-0.47) (-0.61) (-1.83) 
Industry, year, province fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
N 16,339 14,263 12,181 
Adj. R2 0.1242 0.0863 0.0665 
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TABLE 7 (Cont’d) 
 
Panel B: Future inventory write-offs 
 
 Inventory_Offt+k 
 t+1 t+2 t+3 
Induced_EM_Ht 0.0003** 0.0002* 0.0002 
 (2.51) (1.89) (1.09) 
Inventory_Offt -0.0542** -0.0092 0.0409** 
 (-2.39) (-0.43) (1.98) 
ROAt 0.0071*** 0.0042** 0.0063*** 
 (4.27) (2.41) (3.97) 
∆NWCt 0.0018*** 0.0007 0.0005 
 (2.72) (0.96) (0.72) 
∆LTNOAt -0.0013** 0.0006 0.0007 
 (-2.28) (1.02) (0.97) 
∆Salest+k -0.0005 -0.0001 -0.0002 
 (-1.15) (-0.16) (-0.36) 
Industry, year, province fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
N 11,515 9,735 8,183 
Adj. R2 0.0356 0.0259 0.0290 
 
 
Panel C: Future asset impairment losses 
 
 Impairmentt+k 
 t+1 t+2 t+3 
Induced_EM_Ht 0.0005 0.0008*** 0.0008** 
 (1.51) (2.59) (2.28) 
Impairmentt 0.2079*** 0.0753*** 0.0313* 
 (9.21) (3.82) (1.69) 
ROAt -0.0445*** -0.0406*** -0.0379*** 
 (-8.83) (-9.19) (-8.03) 
∆NWCt 0.0004 0.0024 0.0025 
 (0.21) (1.51) (1.55) 
∆LTNOAt -0.0011 -0.0009 0.0012 
 (-0.72) (-0.59) (0.79) 
∆Salest+k -0.0057*** -0.0037*** -0.0027*** 
 (-5.77) (-3.81) (-2.87) 
Industry, year, province fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
N 16,608 14,532 12,438 
Adj. R2 0.1134 0.0617 0.0479 
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TABLE 7 (Cont’d) 
 
Panel D: Future return on assets (ROA) 
 
 ROAt+k 
 t+1 t+2 t+3 
Induced_EM_Ht -0.0139*** -0.0163*** -0.0143*** 
 (-14.67) (-15.12) (-12.46) 
ROAt 0.5241*** 0.3616*** 0.3020*** 
 (33.23) (22.96) (19.24) 
∆NWCt -0.0073 -0.0162*** -0.0194*** 
 (-1.47) (-3.19) (-3.23) 
∆LTNOAt -0.0050 -0.0026 -0.0074 
 (-1.03) (-0.51) (-1.33) 
∆Salest+k 0.0592*** 0.0430*** 0.0373*** 
 (18.13) (12.03) (10.67) 
Industry, year, province fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
N 17,777 15,676 13,536 
Adj. R2 0.3291 0.2014 0.1590 
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TABLE 8 
Benefits of earnings management induced by GDP growth incentives – 
Government subsidies and new loans 
 
This table reports the results from the OLS regression of contemporaneous government subsidies (Subsidy) and one-
year-ahead new loans (New Loans) on the extent of earnings management induced by the GDP growth incentives. 
Induced_EM is calculated as the amount of Overall_EM predicted by GDP_Incentive1 and GDP_Incentive2 in a 
regression of Overall_EM on these two GDP growth incentive measures and the control variables in Regression (1). 
Induced_EM_H is an indicator variable for firm-years with Induced_EM above the sample median. Subsidy is the 
total subsidies received from the governments divided by total assets. New Loans is the change in long-term loans 
divided by total assets. See Appendix B for the measurements of the other variables. The sample includes all the 
firm-years with available data over the 2002-2016 period. Intercepts are included but are not reported. The t-
statistics are based on standard errors adjusted for firm and year level clustering. ***, **, and * indicate two-sided 
significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
 
 Subsidy New Loans 
Induced_EM_H 0.0002** 0.0029*** 
 (2.56) (3.09) 
ROE_NEG_L 0.0001 -0.0055*** 
 (0.46) (-3.50) 
ROE_SEO_L -0.0003** -0.0001 
 (-2.05) (-0.14) 
SIZE -0.0001* 0.0017*** 
 (-1.80) (2.67) 
LEV 0.0015* -0.0065*** 
 (1.88) (-2.85) 
BM -0.0006* -0.0123*** 
 (-1.79) (-4.46) 
GROWTH -0.0001 0.0008 
 (-1.05) (0.87) 
SEO_F 0.0000 0.0176*** 
 (0.16) (9.46) 
EXEC_COMP 0.0000 0.0027*** 
 (0.06) (3.96) 
DUAL 0.0001 0.0020* 
 (1.23) (1.78) 
BOARD_IND 0.0002 0.0092 
 (0.42) (1.43) 
CONTROL_OWN 0.0003 0.0024 
 (1.03) (0.76) 
PLEDGE -0.0000 0.0027*** 
 (-0.59) (2.64) 
BIG4 0.0002 -0.0021 
 (1.50) (-1.02) 
Industry, year, province fixed effects Yes Yes 
N 21,702 17,779 
Adj. R2 0.0428 0.0336 
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TABLE 9 
Effectiveness of earnings management induced by GDP growth incentives –  
Meeting GDP growth benchmark and provincial governor’s promotion 
 
This table reports the results on the effect of the aggregate earnings management induced by GDP growth incentives 
in the province (Induced_EM_PH) on (1) the likelihood of meeting or beating GDP growth benchmark (Panel A) 
and (2) the likelihood of the provincial governor’s promotion (Panel B). Induced_EM_PH is an indicator variable 
for province-years where the sum of Induced_EM across all the firms in the province (summed in dollar amount and 
deflated by the province’s lagged GDP) is above the sample median. Induced_EM is calculated as the amount of 
Overall_EM predicted by GDP_Incentive1 and GDP_Incentive2 in a regression of Overall_EM on these two GDP 
growth incentive measures and the control variables in Regression (1). The sample includes 465 province-years over 
the 2002-2016 period. Intercepts are included but are not reported. Z-statistics are presented in parentheses. ***, **, 
and * indicate two-sided significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively.    
 
Panel A: Meeting or beating GDP growth benchmark 
 
This panel reports the results from the logit regression of meeting or beating GDP growth at the national or the 
adjacent province level (GDPG_MBt) on Induced_EM_PH. GDPG_MBt is an indicator variable for province-years 
whose GDP growth is the same as or higher than the national GDP growth or the average GDP growth of the 
adjacent provinces in year t. GDPGt-1 is the GDP growth of the province in year t-1. GDPG_Nt-1 is the national GDP 
growth in year t-1. GDPG_APt-1 is the average GDP growth of the adjacent provinces in year t-1.  
 
 GDPG_MBt 
Induced_EM_PHt 0.1223*** 
 (2.76) 
GDPGt-1 14.1712*** 
 (9.99) 
GDPG_Nt-1 1.3840 
 (0.92) 
GDPG_APt-1 -14.9779*** 
 (-8.41) 
Province fixed effects Yes 
N 465 
Pseudo R2 0.3543 
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TABLE 9 (Cont’d) 
 
Panel B: Provincial governor’s promotion 
 
This panel reports the results from the ordered logit regression of the provincial governor’s promotion (Promotion) 
on Induced_EM_PH. Promotion equals 2 if the governor is promoted (e.g., becoming a provincial party secretary), 1 
if the governor stays on the post or moves to a similar position (e.g., becoming the governor of another province of 
similar size), and 0 if the governor resigns or is demoted. GDPG is the province’s GDP growth during the 
governor’s tenure, Age is the governor’s age, Age65 is an indicator variable for governors who are 65 or older, 
Education is an indicator variable for whether the governor has a bachelor degree, Tenure is the number of years the 
governor has been in the current position, and Central is an indicator variable for those governors who previously 
worked or are currently holding a joint position in the central government.  
 
 Promotion 
Induced_EM_PH 0.3304** 
 (2.40) 
GDPG 6.3988*** 
 (2.19) 
Age -0.0356 
 (-1.70) 
Age65 -1.9038*** 
 (-3.80) 
Education 0.2079 
 (0.54) 
Tenure 0.0458 
 (1.15) 
Central 0.0294 
 (0.17) 
Province fixed effects Yes 
N 465 
Pseudo R2 0.1380 
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